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DavidSchultz*
Introduction
The constitutional powers of state taxation are at a doctrinal
Rubicon. Prepared to push these powers into a constitutional
quagmire are changes both in technology and in societal patterns of
work and employment.
In terms of technological changes, the rise of the Internet and ecommerce raises important questions about the power of states to
tax commercial transactions when it implicates businesses that are
not physically located in a state but nonetheless have sales in it that
are transacted over the Internet.' Despite the growth of this type of
commerce and its potential for significant tax revenue,' current
constitutional doctrine denies states the capacity to tax this
3
activity.
Similarly., changes in work and life style habits also challenge
state taxation power. By that, the nature of work and employment
in America has changed dramatically in the last twenty to thirty
years. These changes include where the jobs are located in this
country and where people are migrating to locate employment
With this increase in job mobility comes a shift in the type of work
done, where the jobs are located, and where people live. People
often choose or are required to work in certain places that are
* Attorney and Professor, Graduate School of Public Administration and
Management, Hamline University, and Adjunct Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota.
1 See VALTER HELLERSTEIN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE FUTURE OF
STATE TAXATION, INTHE FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION,

207 ( David Brunori ed.

1998) (discussing the impact of e-commerce on state taxation).
2 Id

' See Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (holding that the Commerce
clause precludes states taxing businesses that have sales in a state but otherwise
have no physical presence in that jurisdiction).
4 James Dao, New York City Grows, Even as Many Leave, N.Y. TIMES March
19, 1998, at A20 (noting the shifting patterns of migration in the United States
from the Northeast and Midwest and towards the South and Vest.).
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located in a different jurisdiction, county, or state from where they
live.
Yet this changing pattern of work also brings with it tax
implications, especially if individual taxpayers cross state
boundaries for employment reasons. As the recently decided The
City of[Vew York v. The State of New5 York and the 1998 Lunding
v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York Supreme Court
opinion demonstrated,6 when individuals work in one state, but live
in another, the -tax treatment that states afford nonresident
individual taxpayers can implicate important constitutional
questions with respect to how states apportion their tax burden
without violating the Commerce, Due Process, Privileges and
Immunities, and Equal Protection Clauses.7 In the interest of
preventing states from discriminating against one another,
interstate commerce, and individual taxpayers, the Court has
imposed significant limits on state taxing of instate versus out-ofstate taxpayers. 8
In turn, while the Court and Congress have placed limits upon
state taxation,9 the Court has also aided in the resurgence of
federalism and a return of power back to states by imposing limits
on national power;' yet increased state responsibility thus brings
5 2000

WL 343886 (April 4, 2000) (holding that a state law rescinding a New

York City tax on in-state but not out-of-state commuters who work in the city
violated the United States Constitution's Privileges and Immunities and
Commerce Clauses).
6

522 U.S. 287 (1998).
See Ferdinand P. Schoettle, TAXING NONRESIDENTS- THE 'PUZZLING FAILURE

'
OF ECONOMICS': ChristopherH. Lunding v. State of Nev York, ST. TAX NOTES,

1119 (November 3, 1997) (reviewing the constitutional issues surrounding state
taxation of nonresidents).
' See infra Part Ill.
9 Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Losing Face But Gaining Power: State Taxation

of Interstate Commerce, 16 VA. TAX REV. 347 (1997) (reviewing the various
constitutional limits the Supreme Court has placed upon state's ability to tax
interstate commerce.).

"0See, e.g., Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997);
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) ; U.S. v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (holding Congress lacked the power under the Commerce
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with it increased state revenue requirements and that leads to a
greater need to tax and pay for services."' Increasing or returning
power to states via "New Federalism," but not giving them
increased capacity to raise revenue to address local needs, is
producing a political and, more importantly, for our purposes, a
constitutional doctrine problem. Specifically the constitutional
imperatives of the Commerce Clause to limit state taxing
discretion and prevent states from discriminating against interstate
commerce are at odds with the Court's recent Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence stipulating that states should have increased
autonomy to address their needs. Giving states increased political
and constitutional power yet denying them increased taxing
authority to preserve national uniformity considerations is a
federalism disaster in the making.
Recent examination of state taxation issues and how changing
technology and life style choices are challenging the constitutional
power has focused almost exclusively on e-commerce and state
taxation of commercial transactions over the Internet;12 yet little, if
any, research has been devoted to how these two factors are
impacting state power to tax personal income. More importantly,
throughout the debates on state taxation and regulation of interstate
commerce and how both are affected by the changing workplace
and political considerations, surprisingly little empirical data has
been employed to guide constitutional discussion. By that. in
looking to how states treat residents and nonresidents, little
analysis has been given to ascertaining how many individual
taxpayers actually cross state lines to seek employment. In failing
to examine actual employment migration patterns, there is no real
clause to ban guns in local schools); New York v. U.S., 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992)
(holding Federal government may not compel states to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program).
" See, e.g., Robert Tannenwald, Come the Devolution, Will States Be Able to
Respond?, ST. TAX NOTEs, 357 (February 2, 1998) (examining the fiscal
capacity of states to pay for services).
12 See, e.g., WALTER HELLERSTEIN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE FL.r'.RE

at 214 (1998) David Brunori, STARTING TO SLIDE DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE:
WHAT'S NEXT FOR THE INTERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT?, ST. TAX NOTES 577

(February 22, 1999); Eileen Shanahan, www.taxfreeacom, 12 GOVERNING 34 (
December, 1998).
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analysis in judicial opinions regarding how state taxation actually
influences or affects the behavior of taxpayers. 3 By that, in
Lunding, while the Court ruled that New York's bifurcated tax
deduction treatment between a resident's and a nonresident's
alimony payment amounted to a violation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, 4 it made its ruling without any use of
economic or demographic data to show that in fact the differential
treatment did influence the behavior of taxpayers. In effect,
categorical constitutional claims of discrimination against
interstate commerce are being asserted by the Court without any
empirical foundation to support these assertions.
This Article seeks to fill in some of the missing empirical data in
constitutional doctrine. It examines the scope and status of tax
commuters--individual taxpayers who cross state lines to workand assess how these types of workers are important to the debate
surrounding state taxation of nonresidents and the various tests
employed to test the constitutionality of taxing these individuals.
Part one of this Article outlines the constitutional power states
have to tax individuals. It seeks to examine some of the major
doctrines granting states the power to tax individuals who reside,
domicile, or earn income in a state. This section provides the
groundwork for the major part of the paper which seeks simply to
ascertain who and how many individuals are tax commuters. This
part of the Article will distinguish between commuters,
telecommuters, and professional athletes as three classes of tax
commuters or nonresidents that states may seek to tax. The goal of
this section is simply empirical-providing some estimates to who
crosses state lines for employment purposes. Finally, the last
section of the Article looks both at the constitutional limits placed
on states as well as the implications of these doctrines for state
taxation of commuters. These limits are examined in light of
recent demands to increase the authority states have in political
system.
Overall, what this Article aims to do is multifold. First, it is to
make a plea for empirical analysis of current constitutional
See infra Part III.
"4 Christopher H. Lunding v. State of New York, ST. TAX NOTES 1119
(November 3, 1997)
13
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doctrine. Efforts to clarify how far states may go in taxing without
burdening interstate commerce can be better resolved not by
appealing to abstract constitutional doctrines but instead by using
analysis of current empirical and economic data to clarify what
individuals are really doing when they engage in interstate
commerce and what impact state taxation seems to have on this
behavior. Second, this Article documents the rise of interstate
commuting for employment purposes, indicating how this
potentially gives state greater ability to tax more individuals.
Third, this Article demonstrates how new technologies and
behaviors are challenging current constitutional doctrine. Finally,
the Article notes the inconsistent path the Court's recent federalism
jurisprudence has taken. While the Court has overall increased
state sovereignty and authority it has failed to provide for changes
in state taxation power that reflect the new fiscal needs of the states
that come with this increased sovereignty. Hence, the Court has
failed to shape a constitutional doctrine of state taxation that
reflects the reality of new forms commerce and life style choices.
In sum, this Article will show how an empirical examination of tax
commuting is important to clarification of the debate on the
various constitutional and political issues surrounding states'
capacity and authority to tax nonresidents.
.

State Authority to Tax

States are able to tax the income of individuals who reside or
domicile within their borders, and states may also tax the income
of individuals sourced or earned within their borders.' 5 However,
in some circumstances, states may also be able to tax nonresidents
working outside their borders if an individual elects to work out of
state instead of working at a business that is located within the
taxing state. 6 A brief review of four cases establishes these
principles.

15

JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN. STATE AND LOCAL

TAXATON: CASES AND MATERIALS 872 (1997).
16 Id at 876.
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Taxation based on Residence

A state may tax any individual who takes up residence in a state.
In Evans v. New York,' 7 an individual working in New York City
but living 70 miles away in Pawling, New York, made
arrangements to live with a friend at a church rectory in New York
City. He slept there several nights per week, thereby returning to
his Pawling home on weekends. The taxpayer shared some of the
living expenses with his host friend at the rectory. Eventually,
based upon the taxpayer's 1985 and 1986 tax returns, the City of
New York concluded that Evans was a New York City resident
and therefore was obligated to pay city taxes.'" Evans appealed,
contending that the rectory was not his permanent place of abode
because he did not pay rent or operating expenses and because he
did not hold the rectory out as his residence.' 9 Instead, his
residence was his home in Pawling, New York. Therefore, Evans
concluded, the City of New York lacked the authority to tax is
income.
The New York Appellate rejected Evans claim. Because Evans
shared living expenses with his friend, because he supplied
furniture, and because he kept some clothing there, the court ruled
that the New York City rectory was a residence for Evans and
therefore it was a permanent place of abode that gave the City the
authority to tax Evans on the basis of his residency.2"
B.

Taxation based on Domicile

A State may also tax an individual who makes that state her
domicile. To be domiciled in a state means, among other things, to
be the state where a taxpayer subjectively declares or intends to be
her home; where the taxpayer's family is located; where the
taxpayer votes, registers a car, votes, has regular bank accounts, or

17

1999 A.D. 2d 840,606 N.Y.S.2d 404. (N.Y. App. Div. )(1993).

18 Evans at 405.
19 Id.
20

Id. at 405.
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otherwise has established professional and social relationships.2'
Overall, once a person has established domicile, a state may tax the
income of that person even if the taxpayer is not physically located
or residing in the state.
In Kornblum v. New York," the taxpayer was a long-term New
York City resident who had domicile in the state. In 1983,
Komblum purchased a condominium in Florida and took up
residence in that state. New York contended that despite this
residence in Florida, the taxpayer still had his domicile in New
York for the years 1983-1985 and therefore was required to pay
New York State and City taxes.'
The Court of Appeals indicated that looking merely to the
subjective intent of the taxpayer to change domicile was not
sufficient evidence to determine a change in domicile. Instead, the
court insisted on a review of more objective factors to ascertain
whether Kornblum had actually changed domicile.'" Even though
Komblum obtained a Florida driver's license and had voted in that
state, the fact that he kept a safe deposit box in New York, kept his
New York bank accounts and residence, and continued to use a
New York physician was enough to convince the court that
Kornblum had not abandoned his New York domicile.2 Hence,
New York maintained its authority to tax Kornblum based on his
state domicile.
C.

Taxation based on Source of Income

A state may also tax an individual, even a nonresident, if that
individual sourced and derived income from within the state. In
Shaffer v. Carter,' an Illinois resident and citizen owned and
21

See WALTER HELLERSTEIN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE FUTURE OF

STATE TAXATION, IN THE FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION,

207 (David Brunori ed.

1998).
' 194 A.D. 2d 882, 599 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
23

Id at 159.

24 id

159-160.
252 U.S. 37 (1920).

21 Id at
26
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operated several oil and mining leases within the state of
Oklahoma.27 In 1916, Shaffer earned $1.5 million on these
Oklahoma leases and the state of Oklahoma contended that he
owed $76,000 in taxes based on this income in the state. Shaffer
contended that the tax violated the Due Process, Commerce, and
Privilege and Immunities clauses of the Constitution in that
Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction over him since he was neither a
resident nor domiciled in the state.28
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state. The Court,
quoting Chief Justice Marshall, argued that it was a well- settled
proposition that "all subjects over which the sovereign power of a
state extends, are objects of taxation. 29 In this case, the Court
noted that the State of Oklahoma did not seek to tax nonresidents
for income derived beyond the borders of its state.
Instead,
Oklahoma simply was using its sovereign power to tax income
sourced within its borders and that there was no constitutional
prohibition that would preclude the state from doing this.
D.

Taxation based on Activities Outside a State

Shaffer involved a scenario where the Court affirmed the power
of a state to tax a nonresident nondomiciled individual on income
earned within its borders, yet the Court also suggested that a state
could not tax such an individual on income not earned within its
borders. However, in some circumstances, a state may in fact tax a
nonresident who is not domiciled in the state and who appears to
earn income located outside of its borders.
In Speno v. Gallman,3' a.New Jersey resident domiciled in that
state was employed in New York for 60 days in one year and 43
days in another.32 According to the taxpayer's 1960 New York tax
return, he also worked 252 days outside of New York, of which
174 were in Speno's residence in New Jersey making telephone
27

Id. at 222.

28 Id

29

Id. at 225.

3

Id at 225.

3135
32

N.Y.2d. 256 (1974).

Id. at 257.
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business calls.33 New York claimed that the work performed at
Speno's home in New Jersey was taxable income in New York and
that the state could compute these days in determining Speno's
New York tax obligation.' Speno objected. claiming that the state
lacked jurisdiction to tax this New Jersey activity.
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the authority of the state
to count the New Jersey days in the computation of the New York
income."5 To arrive at this result, the court indicated that in
general a state may not tax a nonresident on income derived from
beyond its borders.36 However, there are some circumstances
under New York law when it may do that. Specifically, codified in
New York tax law37 is the "convenience of employer" test. Under
this test:
[A] nonresident who performs services in New York or
has an office in New York is allowed to avoid New
York tax liability for services performed outside the
State only if they are performed of necessity in the
service of the employer. Where the out-of-State
services are performed for the employee's
convenience, they generate the New York State Tax
liability.38
According to the convenience of employer test, if a nonresident
is required to work outside of New York. then he does not incur a
New York tax liability. If the work is performed simply at the
convenience of the employee, then a New York tax liability
ensues. In Speno's case, he made his business calls from his home
in New Jersey not because he was required to by work, but out of
his own personal convenience. As a result, in applying the
convenience of employer test, the New York court found that
33

Id

34 Id.

35 Id at 259.
36 id
3'
38

NY Income Tax. Reg. § 131.16.
Speno, 35 N.Y.2d at 259.
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Speno's work in New Jersey could be counted as New York work
and therefore included in his tax liability to the state.
E.

Summary

In general, -states have -broad sovereign authority to tax objects
under their control.39 This means that states may tax individuals
who live in their state, are domiciled, or who otherwise earn
income within its borders, even if that income earned is by persons
who are nonresidents. Finally, in some circumstances, a state may
also tax a nonresident who works outside of the state if that work
is done at his convenience when it otherwise would have been
performed within the state.
II.

Tax Commuters:
Analysis

Empirical and Conceptual

Because states have significant authority to tax income sourced
within its borders earned by persons who live, reside, or work
within its jurisdiction, there are many types of nonresidents who
may come under the taxing power of a particular state or states.
This section outlines three classes of nonresidents whom a state
may be able to tax.
State taxation of nonresidents involves a scenario where an
individual taxpayer lives in one state but works in another. For our
purposes, there are three classes of individuals who meet this
definition. First, there is the individual taxpayer who lives in one
state and regularly and physically commutes to another state to
work. This type of individual is our primary image of the tax
commuter since she physically commutes to work regularly and
her regular place of residence and place of work are located in
different states. A second class of workers is the telecommuter.
This is an individual who works at home, for part or all of her
work, but her employer is located in a different state. Unlike the
real tax commuter who physically crosses state lines, a
telecommuter does not physically cross state lines; instead, she
electronically crosses from one state to another. Finally,
" Christopher H. Lunding, ST. TAX NOTES, 11 19(November 3, 1997).
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professional athletes are an example of a third type of tax
commuter. Like the real commuter, athletes represent a class of
individuals who physically cross state lines to work. However,
athletes, as well as many other professionals, do so only for a
portion of their employment.
The commuter, telecommuter, and professional athlete are three
classes of nonresident workers who might come within a state's tax
jurisdiction. For reasons to be described below, the numbers of
individuals of each type is different and the potential tax treatment
of each is also unique.

A.

Commuters

When the Court discusses the state taxation of nonresidents, one
top-of-mind case is that of Christopher Lunding. This is an
individual who lives in Connecticut but works in New York. This
individual physically commutes and crosses state lines to work.
Hence, Mr. Lunding is a tax commuter, and the jurisprudence on
state taxation of individual taxpayers is defined by this type of
taxpayer. However, while Lunding and other cases involving state
taxation of nonresidents focus on tax commuters and how state
laws may influence or affect these individuals, surprisingly little
data has been provided to examine how many individuals fit this
profile.
How many individuals actually cross state lines to work?
Unfortunately, this is not an easy question to answer. When
seeking to gather data for this Article, calls were made to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Internal Revenue Service, and the
revenue departments in the states of New York, Illinois, and
Wisconsin regarding how many individuals cross state lines to
work. None of these offices had data or estimates. Instead, all
suggested calling the Census Bureau. Calls to the Census Bureau
indicated that employment data known as "journey-to-work"
would describe where people lived and worked. However, the data
here generally asked people if they resided and worked in the same
county, not if they lived in one state and worked in another.
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However, 1990 Census data revealed some information on this
issue, with 1980 data also providing some limited information.
The up shot is, while there is a lot of information on individuals
crossing county lines to work, prior to 1980 there is no journey-towork Census data on people cross state lines to work.
Census Data

1.

Drawing upon Census data, the Federal Highway
Administration's Journey-to-Work: Trends in the United States
and its Major Metropolitan Areas, 1960-1990 Final Report
examined changes in employment over a thirty year period.4°
According to the report, from 1960-1990, there was little variation
in the percentage of people who worked in the county of their
residence. In 1960, 81.7% worked in the county of their residence
and in 1990 76.1% did so.4" Yet the actual number of individuals
working outside of their county of residence increased by 36.7%
during this time period.42 From 1980-90, the percentage of
workers employed outside of their county of residence was up by
200%."3 Broken down more specifically, the report examined the
number of individuals working outside their state, and the results
are provided in Table I.
Table I
Residence and Location of Work in the
United States and 39 Top Metro Areas in 1990
Category

U.S. Total

248,709,873
Total
Population

U.S.
%
100%

o Federal Highway Administration,

Metro
Total
123,814,261

Office

Metro
%
100%

of Highway Information

Management, Journey-to-Work: Trends in the United States and its Major
MetropolitanAreas, 1960-1990 FinalReport (1994).
4' Id. at 4-15.
42 Id. at 2-8.
43

Id. at ES-1.
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115,070,274

46.3%

59,704,401

46.3%

87,587,677

76.1%

43,233,668

72.4%

23,488,393

20.4%

14,016,809

23.5%

3,994,204

3.5%

2,377,625

4.0%

According to Table I, 3.5% of the United States workforce
crossed state lines to work, whereas among the thirty-nine largest
metropolitan regions, that percentage was 4.0%. These almost four
million workers are the Christopher Lundings of America-they
are the tax commuters or potential nonresidents that states may tax.
One question that emerges from this table is whether the numbers
and percentages of tax commuters have changed over time.
Unfortunately this report does not provide an answer to this
question.
Turning directly to data provided by the Census Bureau, some
comparisons between 1980 and 1990 are possible. In 1980, there
44
were 96,672,203 workers age sixteen or over in the United States.
In 1990, there were 115,070,274 workers, an increase of 19% from
1980. 45 In 1980, 2,757,177 or 3.1% of the workforce was
employed outside the state of their residence, while in 1990,
3,994,204 individuals or 3.5% of the workers fit this category.6
This means that an additional 1,237,027 workers were employed

Census Bureau, Place of Work-State and County Level-For the United
States(Visited June 5, 1998) <http://www.census.gov/population /socdemo/
44 U.S.

journey/powstco.txt>.
4
46

Id
id
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outside their state of residence.47 Looked at in another way,
between 1980 and 1990, the total workforce increased by 19% but
the number of individuals working outside their state of residence
increased by 44.9%. 48 Clearly, this demonstrates that a small but
increasing total number and percentage of the workforce is
crossing state lines to work.
Another way to examine the data is to look at the aggregate
summary of all 244 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(SMSAs) in the country. Here, only 1990 data is available and one
finds that 3,233,853 of the 91,515,002, or 3.5%, of the workers age
sixteen or over work outside their state of residence. 49 Further, the
percentage of workers crossing state lines varies by city and
region. Table II demonstrates the variance by examining the
SMSA encompassing the ten largest cities in the United States in
1990.
Table II
Residence and Location of Work in the
MSA's of Ten Largest Cities in 1990
City

Total
Workforce

New York
MSA
Los Angeles
MSA
Chicago
MSA
Houston

8,550,473

Total Working Percentage Working
Outside State
Outside State
of Residence
of Residence
543,233
6.4%

6,809,043

23,640

3.5%

3,841,337

95,798

2.5%

1,759,796

10,761

0.6

Philadelphia

2,794,917

269,752

9.7%

San Diego

1,230,446

10,175

0.8%

Detroit

2,079,880

24,390

1.2%

47 Id.
48 id.
49

GEOLYTICS, INC.: CENsus C.D.: THE COMPLETE CENSUS C.D. (1996).
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12,835

0.7%

Phoenix

996,495

9,879

1.0%

San Antonio

569,149

3,262

0.6%

!Dallas

Table II reveals that the percentage of workers crossing state
lines varies from a high of 9.7% in Philadelphia to a low of 0.6%
in Houston and San Antonio. In addition to these ten cities, 4.3%
of the workers in the Boston area and 29.5% of those in the
Washington, D.C. live in one state and work in another. These
statistics reveal many variations in cross-state commutes.
However, while many individuals are crossing state lines to
work, these tables do not indicate why there is wide variation in
commuting patterns. One explanation may be geography. Cities
or SMSAs close or near state borders might be more likely to have
a higher percentage of the workforce crossing state lines. In fact,
geography facially does seem to be a factor. New York and
Philadelphia are located on top of or very close to state borders and
they have the highest percentage of workforce crossing state lines.
In addition, Boston and Washington, D.C. located on top of one or
more state lines, also have high percentages of the workforce
crossing state lines. Conversely, cities like San Antonio which are
far from borders, have low percentages of individuals crossing
state lines to work.
In addition, if one were to examine all 33 SMSAs that cross at
least two states, the percentage of workforce crossing state lines to
work is 8.7%. In comparison, in the 211 SMSAs that include only
one state, only 1.2% of the workers cross state lines. In other
words, while only 31.3% of the total workforce in the 244 SMSAs
are located in the 33 SMSAs that cross state lines, 74.5% of the
workers who cross state lines to work are located in these areas.
Hence, geography seems to be a major factor influencing crossstate employment travel.
But, are individuals who cross state lines to work tax
commuters? In other words, are they crossing state lines for tax
reasons? The Census data do not discuss this. However, all other
things being equal, one measure of the reasons for crossing state
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lines might be the existence or nonexistence of certain taxes, such
as a state income tax. One could hypothesize that, all things being
equal, individuals would be more likely to live in nontax states and
work in tax states, assuming the residence state taxes the income.
Thus, patterns of cross state migration involving an income and
non income tax state would perhaps be higher than migration
patterns that involve states that both have income taxes. Hence,
one crude and perhaps inexact way to see if the existence of an
income tax is-a factor in migration is to compare states that have an
income tax to those that do not and see if the percentages of the
workforce commuting varies.
Seven states: Alaska, Florida, New Hampshire, Nevada, South
Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming, have no income tax for individual
taxpayers." In the 59 SMSAs that include these states, 1.8% of the
population crosses state lines for employment. In contrast, among
the 185 SMSAs that do not include these states, 3.9% of the
population crosses state lines. On first impression, it appears that
employment migration might certainly occur for income tax
reasons. However, one needs to hold constant many factors that
these statistics do not address. For one, geography needs to be
addressed. While some of the SMSAs in the nontax states are
located near tax states--e.g., New Hampshire is near
Massachusetts--many of the SMSAs, such as San Antonio, Texas
and Anchorage, Alaska, are quite far from other states, thus
perhaps discouraging interstate travel. Moreover, if the 1.8%
figure for states without an income tax is compared to the 8.7% for
SMSAs crossing states, it appears again that geography may be
more of a factor than the existence of a state tax in terms of
motivating where one workg.
Overall, while the statistics here are not conclusive and fail to
account for geography, migration between high and low income
tax states, and other types of state taxes, among other variables,
there is some evidence that migration to/from states with
individual income taxes is different than migration from/to SMSAs
that do not identify a non income tax state. However, this
migration pattern is less than in SMSAs that cross state lines. This
'0 Jeffrey L. Krasney, State Income Taxation of Nonresident Professional
Athletes, 2 SPORTS LAW. J. 127, 128 n.6 (1995).
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suggests other variables are operative and influencing migration.
Overall, the data does not support the claim that commuting
patterns and decisions are influenced by taxation.
2.

New York City Commuter Tax Data

A second source of data on tax commuting comes from the New
York State Department of Taxation and Finance (NYSTF) which
tracks the number of commuters who pay this tax. New York City
imposes a commuter tax on individuals who work in the city but
reside outside it borders." This data is provided in Table H.

Table

m

New York City
Nonresident Tax Liability
1983-1996
Year # of NonNYC
Tax Returns
1983

670,564

Tax
Liability
($000)
108,543

1984

683,009

116,532

# of Non NYS
Tax Returns
266,174

Tax
Liability
($000)
43,530

272,039

44,270

"' New York City Administrative Code § 11-1900 et seq. (1999). In 1999, the
New York State Legislature amended state law to preclude the enforcement of
this commuter tax against state residents but kept in place for out-of-state
residents. See N.Y. Tax Law § 1305(b) (McKinney 1999) and N.Y. GeneralCity
Law § 25-m(1)(h) (McKinney 1999). In The City ofNew York v. The State of
New York, 2000 WL 343886 (April 4, 2000), the New York Court of Appeals
invalidated this law as a violation of the federal Privileges and Immunities and
Commerce clauses, thereby invoking a "poison pill" in the state legislation that
would repeal the entire tax commuter law if a court invalidated it. Ild at *2.
Thus, as of this date, the entire New York City Tax commuter law is now
repealed. Despite repeal of the law, the New York City data are still instructive
on the number of people who are tax commuters and how much money is at
stake.
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1985

692,072

125,367

276,355

47,870

1986

698,592

139,425

283,995

53,415

1987

717,883

155,605

300,544

63,450

1988

723,871

172,072

303,609

71,296

1989

731,781

181,679

293,484

70,367

1990

732,766

193,115

314,259

83,696

1991

707,358

184,791

303,183

80,502

1992

720,591

217,060

310,226

98,870

1993

733,532

219,603

315,766

99,636

1994

762,760

223,127

321,950

99,354

1995

757,802

241,032

325,299

108,883

1996

769,293

259,469

314,615

109,356

According to the NYSTF, from 1983-1996, the number of
returns filed by non New York State tax commuters increased by
48,441, representing an 18.2% increase. In comparison, the total
number of returns filed during that period increased by 98,729, or
14.7%, thus indicating a more rapid increase in the number of tax
commuters. In addition, NYSTF data indicated that the actual tax
liability for tax commuters increased by 151.2% during this time
period, while overall the increase was 139%. Finally, as shown in
Table IV, the percentage of returns filed by tax commuters has
increased from 39.7% to 40.9%, with a high of 43.1% in 1993.
Similarly, the actual tax liability percentage for tax commuters
increased from 40.1% of the total liability to 42.2%, with a high of
45.6% in 1992.
Table IV
Percentage Tax Commuter
and Liability: 1983-1996
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1983

Percentage of
Commuters
Living Outside of NYS
39.7

Percentage Tax Liability
of Commuters Living Outside
NYS
40.1

1984

39.8

38.0

1985

39.9

38.2

1986

40.7

38.3

1987

41.9

40.9

1988

41.9

41.4

1989

40.1

38.7

1990

42.9

43.3

1991

42.9

43.6

1992

43.1

45.6

1993

43.0

45.4

1994

42.2

44.5

1995

42.9

45.2

1996

40.9

42.2

Overall, the New York State figures reaffirm trends found in the
Census data. Specifically, that the number of tax commuters, at
least in the New York City area, is increasing, and these
individuals represent a large source of revenue for a state.
3.

Illinois-Wisconsin, Illinois-Indiana, and Wisconsin-Minnesota Data

Another source of estimates regarding the number of individuals
crossing state borders to work grew out of studies done by the state
of Illinois. Illinois has negotiated tax agreements with the states of
Wisconsin and Indiana that would permit residents who cross state
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borders to work to pay their income tax in their state of residence.
Hence, Illinois residents who work in Indiana would not have to
pay Indiana income tax but would pay Illinois income tax. 2
Similarly, Indiana residents who work in Illinois would not have to
pay Illinois income tax but instead would pay Indiana income tax.
A similar agreement was negotiated between Illinois and
Wisconsin. 3 In addition, Minnesota and Wisconsin also have in
place a similar tax agreement for commuters. 4
The fiscal implications of tax commuters is clearly demonstrated
in the Illinois/Indiana and Illinois/Wisconsin agreements.
According to the Illinois Department of Revenue, 21,900 Illinois
residents commute to Indiana to work on a daily basis, while
52,400 Indiana residents commute to Illinois on a daily basis. 5
Given the differences in numbers and the state tax rates, Illinois
determined that it was losing $10 million per year and it demanded
that Indiana pay this amount to Illinois. When the former declined,
Illinois canceled the tax reciprocity agreement.
Similar studies found that 9,100 individuals live in Illinois and
work in Wisconsin while 33,300 Wisconsin residents work in
Illinois.1 6 Hence, Illinois was losing $11 million per year, and like
with Indiana, was demanding that Wisconsin pay its share or the
agreement would be canceled.57 However, at the heart of the
dispute was uncertainty regarding the numbers of people actually
crossing state borders to work,5" leading the two states to differ
over the tax obligations between the two.
Finally, under a tax agreement between Minnesota and
Wisconsin, the latter paid the former $31.9 million in 1995 to
Christi Parsons, State Set to Cancel Indiana Tax Deal"

Non-Resident
Worker Pact Called Unfair, CHICAGO TRIBUNE October 17, 1997 at S 1.
53 Dave Newbart, Wisconsin May Renew Bistate Income Tax Pact, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE February 20, 1998 at N5.
54 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 71.03 (West 1997).
" Christi Parsons, State Set to Cancel Indiana Tax Deal" Non-Resident
Worker Pact Called Unfair, CHICAGO TRIBUNE October 17, 1997 at S1.
56 Steven Walters, Share Income Tax, Illinois demands: Neighbor wants new
deal on workers who live here, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, October 17, 1997 at
Al.
52

57
58

Id.
id.
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make up the revenue Minnesota was losing as a result of the
commuting patterns between the two states.59
Overall, what the agreements among these four states reveal is
that calculation of the exact numbers of tax commuters has serious
revenue implications for states. Knowledge of how many are tax
commuters will lead to a major and growing source of revenue for
states.
B.

Telecommuters

A second category of commuters is telecommuters. The exact
definition of a telecommuter is unclear, but one definition or
categorization suggests that these are individuals who work with a
computer in their own home-based business, or who work at home
for some or part of their employment, and use a computer to access
their out-of-state workplace. 6° For our purposes, however, a
telecommuter is a person who works in one state and engages in
business located in another state. This type of telecommuting may
include home-based businesses that are located in one state and the
workers use the computer to conduct business in another state.
Another definition may include an individual who lives in one state
and uses the computer to access her worksite that is located in
another state. Under either of these definitions, the critical point is
that the residence and place of business or work is located in
another state and the worker uses a computer to access that place
of business or worksite for all or part of her work. Hence, as
opposed to physically crossing state lines to work, a telecommuter
electronically crosses state lines.
Determining how many individuals telecommute is hard to
ascertain. Joanne Pratt reviewed over 20 government surveys in an
attempt to ascertain how many people work at home or otherwise
telecommute. She determined that the number of people who are
self-employed and work at home increased from 2.2 to 3.4 million
s9 Calls by this author to the Wisconsin Department of Revenue in March,
1998, to ascertain the exact number of people crossing the Minnesota and
Wisconsin borders to work indicated that the State's records could not provide
exact numbers or estimates.
60 JOANNE H. PRATT, COUNTING THE NEW MOBILE WORKFORCE, 3 (1997).
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from 1980 to 1990. This represents a 56% increase. 61 In addition,
at least 53.5 million people bring some work home, although it is
not clear if they are using the computer to access a remote
worksite. 6
One study that Pratt examined indicated that in October, 1989,
13,683,000 or 15% of the U.S. households had a computer in the
home.63 Of that population, 12.5% use a computer at home to
work, and of the 9.3 million who said they had a computer at work
and at home, 20% or 1.86 million said they used their computer at
home to do work.' Hence, over 13 million households potentially
have some type of tax commuter, and 1.86 million individuals
potentially could be using a computer to access a worksite located
outside of their state of residence. Unfortunately, none of the
surveys undertaken by the federal government that Pratt studied
asked questions about the location of the residence versus
worksite, including whether that site is located out of state.
In addition to Pratt, a 1995 American Information User Survey
(AIUS) sought to ascertain the number of telecommuters in the
United States. 65 According to this survey, 8.1 million workers
"work at home one or more days per month during normal
business hours. 66 The survey also revealed that another 3.1
million individuals were contract telecommuters-those who are
not employees of a company but work for it on a contract basis.67
Hence, there are over 11 million workers who telecommute to
work according to the AIUS study.
Finally, a 1999 United States Department of Commerce study
found that in 1998 slightly over 25% of all the households in
America had Internet access. 63 Hence, by one measure, several
61 PRATT

at 3.

62 Id.

63 PRATT
64

at 17.

Id.

' Thomas E. Miller, Telecommuting Fact Sheet (Visited on June 14, 1998)
<http://etrg.fmdsup.com/telework/teleindx.html>.
66 Id.
67
68

id.

U.S. Department of Commerce, Falling Through the Net: Defining the

Digital Divide (Visited April 17, 000) http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn99/

contents.html>.
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million households potentially could be using a computer to access
a worksite located outside of their state of residence.
Unfortunately, the surveys examined by Pratt and either the
AIUS or the Department of Commerce studies do not indicate what
percentage of these individuals actually cross state lines and
constitute telecommuters for the purposes of this article. In fact,
one goal of Pratt's study was to examine other federal studies and
to recommend changes in their methodology and questions, with
the intent being to ascertain better information about
telecommuting. 69 Oddly, none of her recommendations sought to
include asking questions about the location of one's residence and
whether the worksite was located out of state.
In addition to the lack of specificity regarding how many people
telecommute across state lines to work, the above studies do not
examine the reasons why individuals telecommute. Generally,
evidence suggests that employees do so often for personal reasons
or convenience, including to take care of children or attend to
family or other personal matters." Why individuals telecommute
is significant because depending on the reason why people work at
home that may influence a state's ability to tax.
For example, assume an individual lives in Connecticut but
works in New York. However, that person also telecommutes to
work two days per week. Under current taxing doctrine, if the
employee is required to work at home those two days per week
then the state of Connecticut may be precluded from taxing the
individual under the convenience of the employer test. If the
employee chooses to work at home for personal reasons, then the
convenience of employee test would suggest that the state of
Connecticut would be able to tax this telecommuter for the two
days of work per week performed at home. Hence, the reason for
telecommuting may be critical to a state's taxing authority over a
telecommuter.
9PRATT at 1.

Municipal Research and Services Center, Telecommuting (Visited on June
14,1998)<http://wwv.mrsc.org/personnelltelcomut.htm;USAToday,
70

Telecommuting GainsMomentum (Visited on June 14, 1998)
<http://www.USAToday.com/life/cyber/ctb5l1 .htm>.
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Overall, the exact number of individuals who are engaged in
telecommuting across state lines is unclear, but no doubt it is
certainly a substantial sum. Also unclear are the reasons why
people telecommute, leaving open some questions regarding the
tax liability and state tax authority over these commuters.
C.

Athletes

The last category of commuters constitutes athletes and other
professionals who cross state lines to work. Athletes are singled
out as the most visible example of a class of individuals who
occasionally cross state lines to work. The class of individuals
who fit into this category is potentially very large. It includes
entertainers who perform in several states, business executives and
sales staff who might go to different states on occasion to work,
and lawyers who may go to a different state to work, consult, or
otherwise assist a client. All of these individuals, like the athlete,
live in one state but travel to one or other states on occasion to
work. Hence, these individuals are potentially subject to numerous
taxing jurisdictions.
There is no estimate of the number of individuals who fit into
this third class. The number could be in the millions, yet there are
no studies to clarify this. However, in the case of professional
athletes, the number of individuals who fit this category is
relatively easy to define-it consists of all the professional athletes
who play for major league sports such as basketball, football,
baseball, and hockey. This number, according to one estimate, is
about 3,300 individuals, including coaches, managers, and other
sports personnel who work with the professional athletes.7'
However, this estimate may be low since it may exclude minor
league professional sports and other sports beyond those listed
above. Whatever the exact number it is certainly a smaller number
compared to telecommuters or real commuters.
Why would states be interested in professional athletes who play
games in their state? Quite simply, their salaries are high.7" For
7'

Krasney at 128.

72 See Stefan Fatsis, NBA Owners Vote to Reopen Labor Pact, Risking
Possibilityof Strike-Hit Season, WALL. ST. J. March 25, 1998 at A6 (noting how

the NBA's current minimum salary is $272,250 per year).
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example, when Michael Jordan played for the Chicago Bulls
basketball team he reportedly earned about $300,000 per game."
With a National Basketball Association schedule consisting of 82
games, that meant that Jordan made about $24 million per year
playing basketball. Generally, Jordan played half or 41 of his
regular season games in Illinois, with the other 41 outside the state.
This means that over $12 million might potentially be taxed by
states other than Illinois.
Moreover, in seeking to create formulae to tax athletes, states
have devised two tests-games played and duty days-as
apportionment tools.74 Under duty days, a state looks to how many
days an athlete is in its state playing a sport versus the total number
of days the athlete plays the sport in a year. That ratio would then
be the state's tax apportionment. Under games played, a state
looks to what percentage of games are played in that state versus
all games played to determine a state's tax share. Thus, for
example, assume that Michael Jordan played the Knicks three
times per year at Madison Square Garden in New York City.
Under duty days, one would look at how many total days Jordan
was in New York to play basketball versus how many days overall
to play basketball. Under a games played formula, one would
multiply his $300,000 salary per game times 3 to get a potential
New York State tax income of $900,000. Multiply this New York
experience with many other states that Jordan played in and
suddenly many states have interests in six or seven figure incomes
by Jordan and other professional sports figures. Combine Jordan's
income with the 3,300 or more athletes also crossing state lines to
play sports and the result is that many states potentially can tax
millions of dollars of income for work or sports performed in their
state.
The personal income of athletes crossing state borders has
important tax implications. 75 These considerations are very similar
73Michael

Jordan's

Salary

(Visited

on

June

7,

1998).

<http:www.cyberhighway.netr transnet/humor/sjordan.htm>.
7 Krasney at 135-8.

s In addition to crossing state borders, many professional athletes also cross
national boundaries, having multinational tax implications. See, e.g., Lindsay
Ann Histrop, Taxation of CanadianResident Athletes and Artists Performing in
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to that of the tax commuters who physically cross state lines to
work. Specifically, they are nonresidents who enter a state to
work. However, unlike tax commuters who live in one state and
perhaps only commute to one other state to work, professional
athletes potentially enter every state that has a professional sports
team in the sport or league one is playing, thereby giving several
states a chance to tax. Hence, the issue here for the athlete is
which states have jurisdiction to tax and for how much; how will
taxes in one state be credited towards another; and how will
different income tax rates in different states factor into decisions of
where to locate income for the purposes of taxation. Finally, the
athlete problem could be even further compounded by the athlete
domiciling in one state; residing in another state where his home
team is located; and playing a sport in several states. Here,
different states simultaneously have jurisdiction to tax premised
76
upon domicile, residence, and source of income.
The issues confronting the taxing of a professional athlete are
representative of the larger problem surrounding the taxing of
other professionals who occasionally cross state lines to work.
Besides simply estimating who and how many people are crossing
state lines to work, there is the problem of apportionment or
ascertaining how many days and what percentage of income a state
may tax. Overall, the potential income that may possibly be at
stake in taxing individuals such as athletes and other traveling
professionals is perhaps quite large, giving cash-starved states
strong incentives to go after such income.

the United States, 32 CAN. TAX. J. 1060 (Nov-Dec. 1984); Lindsay Ann Histrop,
Taxation of U.S. Resident Athletes and Artists PerformingServices in Canada,
16 TAx. MGMT. INT'L.J. 275 (July 10, 1987).
76 See e.g., Scott Miller, Twins get thrown a curve in tax season, SAINT PAUL

PREss, April 15, 1998 at Al (Noting how the Minnesota Twins
baseball team withholds player payroll taxes for five states besides Minnesota,
as well as two cities, and at present must report but not withhold earnings for
New York State). As this article points out, eight jurisdictions presently tax the
earnings of Minnesota baseball players. Multiply the Twins by other
professional sports teams as well as by other employers who have employees
working in multiple jurisdictions and the result is a significant amount of
PIONEER

complexity if not a burden for employees and employers engaged in interstate

commerce.
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Summary

Commuters, telecommuters, and athletes represent three classes
of individuals who cross state borders for employment purposes.
All three types of these individuals may be taxed by states under a
variety of rules related to the residence, domicile, or location of the
source of income; and depending on the reasons for a person being
in a state, a state's jurisdiction to tax a nonresident individual
taxpayer may or may not be implicated.
Even though commuters, telecommuters, and athletes all may be
subject to multiple state taxation, there is generally little data
available regarding how many individuals fit into any of these
categories. In the case of tax commuters, evidence suggests that
their numbers are increasing. For telecommuters, the presumption
is their number is also increasing, although no firm data exists. For
athletes and professionals who occasionally cross state lines, the
numbers may be large and growing, but there is no solid data
Finally, even though the
providing a definitive answer.
assumption is that the numbers of people crossing state lines is
increasing, the reasons for this acceleration in commuting are
unclear. Perhaps tax considerations are important to this decision,
but so far there is little evidence to substantiate this.
IM.

Constitutional Restrictions on State Taxation
of Individual Taxpayers

States have broad authority to tax individuals who earn income
in their state. Oftentimes, these individuals are not residents of the
state. 7 Despite this broad authority to tax, the United States
Constitution imposes limits upon the ability of states to tax. These
limits are found in the Commerce, Due Process, Equal Protection,
and Privileges or Immunities clauses. Within the jurisprudence of
all these clauses is the argument that states may not discriminate
against interstate commerce or nonresidents, or otherwise prefer
their residents or commerce at the expense of nonresidents or outof-state commerce. While many of the constitutional tests the
I Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
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Court has fashioned on this issue go beyond their application to
individual taxpayers, a central thrust of allt of these tests is to
prevent states from engaging in pure protectionism.
.These different legal claims rest upon a specific economic theory
to maintain national markets, to encourage the free flow of goods,
or.otherwise eneourage, open borders., Hence, the -assumption is
that certain types of state taxation or activity may impede this free
flow of goods orcommerce What this-suggests, for example, is
that certain -types of taxes are factors considered in making
economic decisions in interstate commerce. However, under the
prevailing tests, there is little hard economic evidence to show that
this is.
true.
A quick review ofithe case law demonstrates that the Court: has
not generally used empirical economic data to show the impact of
specific taxes on taxpayers when seeking to ascertain whether a tax
is discriminatory.
A.

Commerce Clause

Under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, states may
not directly, discriminate against interstate commerce. The Court
has indicated that facial and direct discrimination by a state against
interstate commerce is always unconstitutional. As far back as
Gibbons v. Ogden,78 the Court has used the Commerce clause to
limit state taxation of interstate commerce. Moreover,' even in
cases where Congress has not directly sp6ken or acted on an issue,
the Court has applied the "dormant" Commerce clause to
invalidate: certain state regulations that clearly discriminate against
interstate commerce. However, there are situations !where the
discrimination isinot facial and direct. Instead, in cases where the
regulation is. indirect, it may be upheld if it meets several
conditions: of a-balancing test..Although-the criteria-for determining the validity ofstatutes
affecting. interstate. -commerce have. been, variously stated, the
general rule that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where, the
statute regulates -evenhandedly -to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest,- and its effects on interstate commerce are only
78

9 Wheaton 1 (1824).
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incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. The extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities.
Under the Pike test,' even if a state discriminates against
interstate commerce, the regulation will be upheld if, on balance,
local interests outweigh the burdens on interstate commerce and
the regulation serves an important local purpose.
In addition to the above limits, when state tax income is derived
from interstate commerce there are two additional requirements.
First, under Complete Auto Transit v. Brady,"' states must meet
four requirements before they can tax. First, there must be a nexus
between an activity and the state. Second, the tax must be fairly
apportioned to the share of property or income generated within
the state. Third, the tax must not discriminate against interstate
commerce and fourth ,the tax must be related to the benefits
provided by the state. Hence, for example, a company or
individual that does not have an office in the state or whose only
contact would be through the mail, would not possess sufficient
contacts to justify taxation.' Thus, Michael Jordan could not be
taxed on his basketball income by states where he does not play
basketball. Moreover, the tax on Jordan could only be based on
income generated within the state and not based on the income
generated from playing basketball in all the different states. Third,
the tax must not discriminate by favoring resident players over
non resident players. Finally, there must be some connection
between the tax and benefits or services Jordan receives.

I

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1971).
1 See also: C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 114 S.Ct.
1677 (1994); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Quality of Ore., 511 U.S. 93, (1994), illustrating other recent applications and
statements of this test.)
81

430 U.S. 274 (1977).

See e.g., Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S.298 (1992).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000

29

Touro Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [2000], Art. 13

464

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 16

The Court has also imposed an "internal consistency" test83 on
some taxation, arguing that a state tax would be unconstitutional
unless the tax, if applied by every jurisdiction, would not result in
an impermissible interference with free trade.' Third, the Court
also applies a dormant Commerce clause test, striking down state
taxes that discriminate even in the absence of Congressional
action.
These various Commerce Clause rules may implicate the ability
of a state to tax commuters, telecommuters, and athletes. If a
taxpayer could demonstrate that the tax directly discriminates
against interstate commerce, or that the tax indirectly burdens
interstate commerce so that national burdens outweigh local needs,
or that the tax is unfairly apportioned, then a state might be
prohibited from taxing these commuters.
B.

Due Process and Equal Protection

Closely related to the Commerce clause, the Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses also impose limits upon the ability of a
state to tax an individual. While the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses are distinct parts of the Fourteenth Amendment,
generally Equal Protection tax claims between residents and
nonresidents will be treated the same as Due Process claims. This
is true unless some type of fundamental right or suspect
classification is implicated.85 For our purposes, the analysis here
will be directed towards Due Process.
The Court stated in NationalBelle Hess v. Illinois Departmentof
Revenue,86 that although the Due Process and Commerce clauses
are "closely related,"" they impose "distinct limits on the taxing
power of states." See, Quill v. North Dakota.8" While Congress
83

See e.g., Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue,

483 U.S. 232, 239 (1987), Arrnco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984)
(discussing the application internal consistency test).
' Armco, 467 U.S. at 644.
' WALTER HELLERSTEIN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE FUTURE OF STATE

TAXATION, INTHE FUTURE OF STATE TAXATION,
8

at 51-64, 82-83.

386 U.S. 753 (1967).

87 Id. at 756.

88 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992).
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can lift the bar on regulation by states under the Commerce clause,
it cannot do so under the Due Process clause.89 Hence, the Due
Process clause imposes an absolute bar on certain types of state
activity.
One historical requirement of the Due Process clause was that a
state could not act against an individual or entity unless there was
some nexus or connection between the person and the state.' In
addition, for tax purposes, "income attributed to the State for tax
purposes must be rationally related to 'values connected with the
taxing State."' 91 In general, the second requirement has not been
as important as the first, making the establishment of nexus the
critical issue under the Due Process clause for taxing purposes.
Exactly what the nexus requirement is has been problematic, but
generally some physical presence in the state, no matter how
remote, was enough to create a nexus. For example, in Scripto,
Inc. v. Carson,' the Court upheld a tax on a seller even though the
entire physical presence in the state was based on in-state
solicitation by independent contractors. However, despite this
minimal presence, it was more than that found in Belles Hess
where the Court refused to allow a tax on a company whose only
nexus with the state was through the mail. Thus, physical presence
in the state seems to be a minimal requirement to uphold a state tax
under the Due Process clause.
However, in Quill, the Court reversed its ruling in Belles Hess,
arguing that having a physical presence in the state was not
essential to establishing the nexus to tax. Instead, contacts though
the mail may be sufficient. 3 The Court reached this conclusion by
drawing upon its Due Process state jurisdiction cases which had
rejected physical presence in lieu of a more flexible test that
looked to whether a defendant had "minimum contacts" with a
89 Id

9 See, e.g., Miller Brothers v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954) (Stating
that the Due Process clause "requires some definite link, some minimum
connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to
tax.").
91 Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267,273 (1978).
92362 U.S. 207 (1960).
93

Quill,504 U.S. at 307.
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state 9' or had "purposively availed itself of the benefits of an
economic market" of a state.' In Quill, the Court concluded that "a
mail-order house. . . is engaged in continuous and widespread
solicitation of business within a State. Such a corporation clearly
has "fair warning that [its] activity may subject [it] to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign."' Thus, the Court found that a
mail-order company like Quill that had "purposively directed its
activity" towards a state would be found to have a nexus under the
Due Process clause even if the company had no physical presence
in the state. 7
Quill was a mixed blessing for states. Under the Due Process
clause, the case strengthened the ability of states to tax entities that
do business in the state. This would suggest that a state could
probably tax a telecommuter under the Due Process clause since
one could argue that the commuter had purposively directed its
activity towards the state. Even if one rejects the argument that the
telecommuter's income is sourced in the taxing state, Quill
provides a possible additional Due Process nexus to tax. Yet Quill
also maintained the Commerce clause bar on state activity,
suggesting that regardless of physical presence, state taxes that
discriminate against interstate commerce or which otherwise
conflict with the dormant Commerce clause, would be invalidated
unless Congress approved the tax.
C.

Privileges and Immunities Clause

9 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
9 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzeicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). (Where the

Court stated: "Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely
because the defendant did not physically enter the forum State. Although
territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant's affiliation
with a State and reinforce the reasonable forseeability of suit there, it is an
inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business
is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus
obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is
conducted. So long as a commercial actor's efforts are 'purposefully directed'
toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that
an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there."). Id.
9 Id. at 308 (Quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S., at 218 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
97

Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
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Under the Privileges and Immunities clause, states are forbidden
from treating nonresident citizens differently from their own
residents. As the Court stated in Paul v. Virginia,93 the object of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause is to "strongly... constitute
the citizens of the United States one people," by "plac[ing] the
citizens of each State upon the same footing with the citizens of
other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in
those States are concerned."' In the context of taxes, this meant
that a citizen of any State should be able to "remove to and carry
on business in another without being subjected in property or
person to taxes more onerous than the citizens of the latter State
are subjected to."'°
In general, to determine whether a different tax treatment for
nonresidents and residents was valid under the Privileges and
Immunities clause, the Court invoked the twofold Piper test and
asked if "(i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in
treatment; and (ii) [if] the discrimination practiced against
nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State's
objective."' ' If a state court meet both prongs of the test, the
differential treatment would be upheld. In general, this test means
that a state cannot deny nonresidents a general tax exemption
provided to residents." z It has also precluded different rules for
residents and nonresidents in terms of deductions for business and
nonbusiness expenses and in-state income. 0 3
Lunding v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York"
represents one of the most recent Supreme Court applications of
the Privileges and Immunities clause to limit state taxation. Here,
a Connecticut resident who worked in New York objected to the
latter's law which denied a nonresident the income tax deduction
98 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
99 Id at 180.

0 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 56 (1920).
Sup. Ct. of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274,284 (1985).
102 See, e.g., Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 665 (1975).
103 Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
104 118 S.Ct. 766 (1998).
101
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for alimony paid."° Lunding objected to the differential treatment
and after losing in tax court but prevailing in a state supreme court
and then eventually losing at the New York Court of Appeals on
the Privileges and Immunities claim, the taxpayer was granted cert.
before the Supreme Court.' 6
In applying the two part Piper test to the New York tax law, the
Court first tried to determine the reason New York gave for the
different treatment of residents and non-residents. According to
the state, New York did not have jurisdiction over Lunding's
personal activities, such as divorce and alimony, that were outside
of the state. The state asserted that expenses such as these should
not have to be considered when applying its tax code to
nonresidents. On the other hand, if the plaintiffs divorce and
other personal activities were within the state, as is the case with
residents, then a consideration of such a deduction would have
been proper."
A majority of the Court rejected this reason. The Court
indicated that there was no evidence in the legislative history of
§ 631(b)(6) to suggest that its purpose was to limit deductions of
expenses related to residence in another state." 8 Moreover, the
Court also stated that this differential treatment of residents and
nonresidents could lead to a situation where a nonresident may pay
substantially more tax than a resident"°9 and therefore, the state
would be treating the two parties substantially different." 0 In
short, New York had failed to provide a substantial justification for
its treatment of nonresidents and therefore, § 631(b)(6) violated
the Privileges and Immunities clause.
The implications of Lunding are unclear, but potentially
significant.
The holding suggests that almost any personal
expenses of nonresidents sourced outside of a state but which

10' N.Y. TAX LAW § 631 (b)(6) (McKinney 1987).
" Lunding at 772. In addition to the Privileges and Immunities claim,
Lunding also raised Equal Protection and Commerce Clause issues which shall
be ignored here.
107

Lunding at 780-81.

108Lunding at 781.
109Id.

110 Id.
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impact the tax treatment of the nonresident taxpayer in comparison
to the resident taxpayer will need to be counted. This ruling
narrows if not eliminates state exclusion on nonresident, nonstate
personal deductions unless some substantial justification can be
shown. Exactly what would be is left in doubt in Lunding.
However, in terms of the implications of this ruling for commuters,
it opens up numerous Privileges and Immunities issues. For
example, will states be required to allow tax personal deductions
sourced outside the state to telecommuters or professional athletes?
Perhaps not, but by not allowing this deduction, even to people
who only occasionally or never set foot in the state, there may be a
Privileges and Immunities violation. In brief, not only does it
place limits on the kinds of taxes that can be imposed but it may
also be a crow bar forcing states to provide additional tax breaks to
those who are taxed. It is, potentially, then, no simply a limitation
on states but also perhaps an affirmative requirement that seems to
say "If a state taxes residents and nonresidents it has to treat them
the same."

IIL.

Conclusion: Taxation and Political Federalism

The Constitution places significant limits on the ability of states
to tax interstate commerce. One of the implications of these limits
is that while states have broad and diverse fiscal needs, often times
state authority to generate revenue must take a backseat to the
needs of the national government to maintain a unified national
market. States are thus faced with a conflict between having the
need to tax yet such taxation might very well be damaging to other
important political and economic goals in the United States.
At the same time that states are subjected to numerous
constitutional limitations on their power to tax interstate
commerce, states also have their own important police power and
constitutional functions to perform. In particular, states are
sovereign units, required to perform numerous functions related to
education, social welfare, and public safety, among other duties.
Moreover, given the rise of the numbers of individuals who
commute across state lines to work, states will no doubt face
increased pressures and needs to address the costs associated with
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these new workers. Hence, there is a strong incentive to tax
commuters.
In addition, recent changes in the political climate in the United
States has supposedly returned more political control back to the
states. For example, the 1994 Republican Party Contract for
America sought to return more control to the states over welfare
and it also sought to place limits on the government mandating that
the states perform federal duties without also receiving federal
funds.' This "Unfunded Mandates" law,"' as well as other recent
Supreme Court limits on federal power over states all suggest that
at least in theory, states are enjoying increased political power in
the federal system. 3
While states are reaping the benefit of increased political
autonomy, they do not appear to be reaping any increased state
taxation power under the Constitution. As Lunding suggests, states
are still subjected to significant limits on how they tax residents
and nonresidents because this taxation autonomy threatens the
maintenance of a national uniform economy. Thus, we have a
paradox. How, for example, can we give states more political
control over their destiny when that control may impinge upon
interstate commerce. Or, how do we give states more control while
at the same time limit their ability to tax? In the context of tax
commuters, the challenge is that as more people cross state
boundaries to work, more and more individuals are facing multiple
taxation in several states. What we do not know is exactly how
this possibility of multiple taxation actually influences commuting
decisions or how it may impede or otherwise influence interstate
...ED GILLESPIE AND BOB SCHELLHAS EDS., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE
BOLD PLAN BY REPRESENTATIVE NEWT GINGRICH AND REPRESENTATIVE DICK
ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (1994).
2 U.S.C. 1501 etseq. (1999)
See, e.g., Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2219 (1999); College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board, 119 S.Ct. 1354 (1999);
Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) ; U.S. v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Congress lacked the power under the Commerce
clause to ban guns in local schools); New York v. U.S., 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992)
112
113

(Federal government may not compel states to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program).
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commerce. Perhaps when only a few people crossed lines to work
the threat of multiple taxation was not a major issue, but w,,ith the
increase in the numbers and types of those who occasionally or
routinely cross state lines physically, or who cross state lines
electronically, the cumulative burdens of this taxation may have a
pronounced effect on interstate commerce, yet we do not know.
As this Article has shown, tax commuters are of at least three
different types with little if any attention has been given to
understanding how state taxation may influence these commuters.
Different theories on what constitutes tax discrimination rest upon
an assumption that specific taxes or regulations will in fact
discriminate. By that, to discriminate may mean to inhibit or deter
interstate commerce. However, there is no hard evidence on the
impact of taxes on the three different types of tax commuters
examined in this Article. Instead, commuting in general seems to
be increasing in spite of the fact that states have the opportunity to
tax much of this activity.
What we are left with then is a state taxation power that is both
overinclusive and underinclusive. It is overinclusive in that states
may be able to tax the income of people who never physically set
foot in their state, potentially stretching the long hand of state
taxation (and perhaps ulimately personal jurisdiction for lawsuits)
in an almost limitless 'fashion. It is underinclusive in that at
present the Constitution may be limiting states' capacity to fashion
taxation policies that reflect the new realities of work and
commuting that are arising.
What this Article concludes with then is a statement about
constitutional doctrine. First, there is an absence of data regarding
the numbers, reasons, and how tax rates or differential tax
treatments really influence behavior. What if individuals are not
deterred by tax differences or that tax differences are not
considered when decisions to commute are being made. If there is
no real empirical deterrence of commuting, is there discrimination?
Ferdinand Schoettle is correct that we need an economic theory of
tax to guide our understanding of state taxation." 4 Second, even
more that a theory is needed. Instead, economic data to test theory
14

Schoettle at 1119.
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is required. It is required, in part, because the rise of commuting of
all types may challenge the current way the constitutional line is
drawn between state power to tax and the national needs to
maintain a uniform national economy. In demanding this empirical
informatiorpthe'Court would'not be venturing into foreign territory.
After all, court doctrine in the past has been influenced by life
experiences and social facts" 5 and recently its Commerce clause
jurisprudence has demanded of Congress empirical grounding to
support legislation." 6
Finally, what is lacking in the Court's jurisprudence on tax
discrimination is an analysis of how taxation actually influences
behavior. What is needed is a better understanding of how the
"' The reference here is to Louis Brandeis' brief presented to the United States
Supreme court in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), documenting the
harsh working conditions facing women. As a result of providing empirical
evidence of the working conditions facing women in factories, the Court upheld
a state law regulating work place safety at a time when the Court did not seem
supportive of such type of regulations. See also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience") as recognition that the law rests not just upon categorical
declarations but must reflect social changes.
116 United States v. Lopez, 414 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (Holding that Congress
lacked the constitutional authority under the Commerce clause to make it a
crime to carry a gun within 1,000 feet of a school because Congress had failed to
demonstrate on the record how gun possession here affected interstate
commerce), where the Court stated:
Although as part of our independent evaluation of
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of course
consider legislative findings, and indeed even congressional
committee findings, regarding effect on interstate commerce, see,
e.g., Preseaultv. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17, 110 S.Ct. 914, 924-925,
108 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), the Government concedes that "[n]either
the statute nor its legislative history contain[s] express
congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate
commerce of gun possession in a school zone." Brief for United
States 5-6. We agree with the Government that Congress
normally is not required to make formal findings as to the
substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate
commerce .... But to the extent that congressional findings would
enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in
question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though
no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are
lacking here.
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increases in tax commuting may be challenging current theories of
state authority and discrimination on taxation. Once we have that,
then perhaps the Court can shape a constitutional doctrine that is
both consistent with its other federalism decisions and with the
changing patterns of work and technology.
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